Several residents of District 6 asked Wednesday to intervene in two lawsuits filed Tuesday over the Marti Rutherford residency issue.

Attorney Stuart James said he represents several Brainerd residents who object to Ms. Rutherford continuing to hold her post.

Candy Corneliussen, Alan E. Richelson and Julia Morgan Scott said they were denied the right to vote for a valid representative who lives in the district.

City Attorney Randy Nelson filed an ouster petition Tuesday afternoon in Chancery Court asking that Councilwoman Rutherford be removed from office over a residency issue.

Earlier Tuesday, attorney John Anderson beat him to the punch by filing a lawsuit in Circuit Court in behalf of Ms. Rutherford. It calls for a jury to hear the case.

City Attorney Nelson told the City Council his office had carried out an extensive investigation and concluded that a complaint filed by District 6 citizens was valid.

Then on Tuesday night at the regular City Council meeting, the council voted to file charges against Ms. Rutherford in a separate process.

The vote was 7-1 with Ms. Rutherford opposed. Councilman John "Duke" Franklin was absent.

City Attorney Nelson is to file charges that he said will be very similar to what is in the ouster suit. The council is expected to review them next Tuesday, then Ms. Rutherford would have a right to file an answer. Then the council would hold a hearing on whether or not to expel her from the council.

Councilman Leamon Pierce, who moved for the council action, said the court cases might be tied up for a lengthy period, and the council could proceed quickly.

City Attorney Nelson said the ouster process "would have a burden of proof that probably exceeds that the council needs to find."

Councilman Jack Benson said after reading the ouster suit that "clearly, clearly the evidence is irrefutable that she is not eligible to represent District 6 as their councilperson."

City Attorney Nelson said the City Council has powers "to judge the eligibility of its members."

The citizen complaint filed earlier said Ms. Rutherford actually resides in District 5 - not District 6.

Ms. Rutherford said she was "extremely disappointed" in the ouster action.

She said, "I am very fortunate to have outstanding legal representation." She said she will pursue the matter in court "so I can continue to provide the constituents of District 6 with my vigorous representation."

Ms. Rutherford said she has received hundreds of calls and greeting cards in support. She said her greatest supporters have been Melinda Hickey, Larry Wells and Judge Walter Williams. She said, "Whatever happens, I found that I have three great friends."

Ms. Rutherford has maintained that her legal residence was a "mother-in-law apartment" she set up in a house on Alta Vista Drive in District 6.

She was at her residence on Hemphill Drive in District 5 on Monday afternoon when someone fired a shot through one of her windows with a BB gun.

City Attorney Nelson said in the lawsuit that Ms. Rutherford apparently has never spent the night on Alta Vista and that she spends her time and conducts business on Hemphill. He said her three cats and a dog stay at Hemphill.

He said neighbors at Alta Vista have never seen her there and never seen the light on in her unit there.

City Attorney Nelson said the fact Ms. Rutherford said she recently moved her legal residence to Sweetbriar Avenue in District 6 because of problems caused by her Alta Vista landlord is irrelevant.

Councilman Leamon Pierce asked about Ms. Rutherford staying on the council while the issue is battled in court. Attorney Nelson said he knew of no authority for suspending Ms. Rutherford from office.

The afternoon council meeting was moved from the small J.B. Collins Room where committee meetings are normally held to the much-larger City Council meeting room.

Ms. Rutherford came down prior to the meeting and greeted many in the audience who were apparently there in her support.

Attorney Nelson said he expects the courts will take up the case rather quickly. He said ouster cases are normally handled quicker than declaratory judgment suits.

Asked which of the two suits may be handled first, he said, "The time frame of the ouster suit is generally much quicker than a declaratory judgment."

He said in an ouster suit, the defendant is given 20 days in which to file an answer.

Attorney Nelson said if the City Council decides to move itself to oust Ms. Rutherford there would have to be charges drawn up and notice given of a hearing. She would be given a chance to respond to the charges.

Attorney Anderson said the residency issue is complex, but he said Ms. Rutherford "has acted in good faith to do the right thing."

He said she has "outstanding support" from District 6 residents with good rapport with residents and business owners. "She certainly has a passion for her district."

He said, "She may be the hardest-working member on the council."

Attorney Anderson said, "Ms. Rutherford is anxious for the court to make a decision, but she wants it to be on a deliberate, methodical basis."

Attorney Anderson said in his suit that Ms. Rutherford "has not acted in any manner sufficient to violate a penal statute involving moral turpitude."

Here is the ouster petition filed by City Attorney Nelson:

IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ex rel. :
:
RANDALL L. NELSON, Chattanooga :
City Attorney, : DOCKET NO. ____________
:
Relator, :
: PART ____________
v. :
:
MARTHA P. RUTHERFORD, :
:
Defendant. :

PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF OFFICER
Comes now Randall L. Nelson as City Attorney of the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee pursuant to his duty under T.C.A. § 8-47-103 and upon relation of ten (10) or more citizens of the City of Chattanooga and State of Tennessee pursuant to T.C.A § 8-47-110 for cause of action pursuant to Tennessee law does say as follows:
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1. Randall L. Nelson is the duly appointed and serving City Attorney of the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, a municipal corporation. The City Attorney is authorized pursuant to T.C.A. ' 8-47-101, et seq. to institute proceedings in ouster against municipal officers of the City of Chattanooga. The City Attorney is authorized by law to institute such actions with or without any complaint being made to him and to investigate and institute proceedings in Circuit, Chancery or Criminal Court to oust such officer from office pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-103.
2. Defendant, Martha P. Rutherford, was elected to the District 6 seat of the Chattanooga City Council and took her oath of office as a member of the Chattanooga City Council on April 18, 2005. Defendant Rutherford continues to serve in that capacity.
3. This petition is brought for the ouster of Defendant from office as a member of the Chattanooga City Council pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 8-47-101 et seq. T.C.A. § 8-47-101 states as follows:
Every person holding any office of trust or profit under and by virtue of the laws of either state, county, or municipal, except such officers as are by the Constitution removable only and exclusively by methods other than those provided in this chapter, who shall knowingly or willfully commit misconduct in office, or who shall knowingly or willfully neglect to perform any duty enjoined upon such officer by any of the laws of the state, or who shall in any public place be in a state of intoxication produced by strong drink voluntarily taken, or who shall engage in any form of illegal gambling, or who shall commit any act constituting a violation of any penal statute involving moral turpitude, shall forfeit such office and shall be ousted from such office in the manner hereinafter provided. (Emphasis added.)

4. The following section, Section 8-47-102 provides:

The Attorney General and Reporter has the power on the Attorney General’s and Reporter’s own initiative and without any complaint having been made to the Attorney General and Reporter or request made of the Attorney General and Reporter to institute proceedings in ouster against any and all state, county, and municipal officers, under the provisions of this chapter, and the District Attorneys General, County Attorneys, and City Attorneys, within their respective jurisdictions, may institute such actions without complaint being made to them or request made of them as they are authorized to institute upon request made of them or complaint made to them. (Emphasis added.)

5. The following section, Section 8-47-103 provides that:

It is the duty of the Attorney General and Reporter, the District Attorneys General, County Attorneys, and City Attorneys, within their respective jurisdictions upon notice being received by them in writing officer herein mentioned has been guilty of any of the acts, omissions, or offenses set out in Section 8-47-101, forthwith to investigate such complaint; and if upon investigation such person finds that there is reasonable cause for such complaint, such person shall forthwith institute proceedings in the Circuit, Chancery, or Criminal Court of the proper county, to oust such officer from office. (Emphasis added.)
6. Two written petitions making charges that the defendant is not qualified to hold office as a member of the Chattanooga City Council have been lodged with the City Attorney. Copies of these petitions are attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibits A and B.
7. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-103, the City Attorney has conducted an investigation after receiving two separate written complaints dated August 28, 2007 and August 30, 2007 from Attorney Mark Brooks (Exhibit A) and a written complaint dated August 28, 2007 signed by seventeen (17) residents of District 6 (Exhibit B). The allegations contained in the written complaints assert that Defendant did not live in District 6 when she qualified for her office and that she has been guilty of acts, omissions, or offenses which may result in her removal from office as set forth in T.C.A. '8-47-101, et seq.
8. After conducting an investigation since August 30, 2007, the City Attorney finds that there is reasonable cause for such complaints and has instituted this action pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-103 to oust such officer.
9. During the course of this investigation, Defendant has stated that her “legal residence” is at 3442½ Alta Vista Drive; however, the City Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that this address is not her residence for determination of her eligibility to hold office as District 6 council member.
10. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-104, the City Attorney has issued subpoenas to such persons believed to have any knowledge of the complaints made. Subpoenas for a number of witnesses were issued and a number of sworn interviews under oath have been obtained by the City Attorney pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-105 on September 13 and 14, 2007.

11. It is the duty of the City Attorney pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-111 to aid and assist in the prosecution of any action upon relation of ten (10) or more citizens of the City of Chattanooga.
12. The charges against the defendant justifying the ouster and the results of the investigation conducted by the City Attorney pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-103 are set forth herein.
STATEMENT OF REASONABLE CAUSE
13. The principles for determination of residence for purposes of determining the defendant’s eligibility for office are set forth in T.C.A. §2-2-122, pertinent parts of which are set forth below:
T.C.A. §2-2-122. Principles for determination of residence – Factors involved.

(a) The determination of whether a person is a resident or where the person resides or has residence for purposes of the election code shall be made in the light of the following principles:

(1) The residence of a person is that place in which the person's habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has a definite intention to return; provided, that a person may not register to vote using a business location as the registration address when the sole basis for the person's presence at such location is based on a business or commercial use;

(2) A change of residence is generally made only by the act of removal joined with the intent to remain in another place. There can be only one (1) residence;

(3) A person does not become a resident of a place solely by intending to make it the person's residence. There must be appropriate action consistent with the intention;

14. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 2-2-122, there are specific factors which may be considered in determining residence for publicly elected officials.
b)(1) The following factors, among other relevant matters, may be considered in the determination of where a person is a resident:
(A) The person's possession, acquisition or surrender of inhabitable property;

(B) Location of the person's occupation;

(C) Place of licensing or registration of the person's personal property;

(D) Place of payment of taxes which are governed by residence;

(E) Purpose of the person's presence in a particular place; and

(F) Place of the person's licensing for activities such as driving.

15. The Chattanooga City Charter establishes the qualifications for a member of the City Council in Section 8.2 as follows:
Sec. 8.2. Qualifications of council members.

The City shall be divided into nine (9) districts within the geographic boundaries of the city. The city council shall be composed of nine (9) members with each member elected from one of such single districts. The candidate for each council position who receives the majority of his or her district shall be elected. No person shall be elected or appointed as a member of the council who is not at least 21 years of age and who has not been a resident of the district for at least one year preceding his or her election.

16. Pursuant to investigation, the City Attorney has learned that Defendant owns a single-family home at 308 Hemphill Avenue which was her legal address from 1969 until she claims to have changed her residence in November 2003 to 3442½ or 3442B Alta Vista Drive. This location of Defendant’s real property at 308 Hemphill is not within District 6, her elected district, and does not comply with Chattanooga City Charter Section 8.2. The property at 3442½ or 3442B Alta Vista Drive is within District 6 and to be lawfully qualified as a City Council member for District 6, the defendant must show that she lawfully changed her place of residence from 308 Hemphill to 3442½ or 3442B Alta Vista Drive.
17. Defendant maintains a real estate office at 308 Hemphill Avenue which contains two computers, three printers, a fax machine and all her real estate files. All of Defendant’s personal records are also stored in this office and this office is used to pay all her bills, including her personal bills.
18. Defendant has listed 308 Hemphill Avenue as her residence on documents filed with the Tennessee Real Estate Commission. Defendant is a licensed realtor who conducts business at 308 Hemphill Avenue. Pursuant to the Chattanooga City Code, Appendix B, known as the Zoning Ordinance, Article II, a Home Occupation is defined as:
Home Occupation: An occupation in a dwelling unit, provided that:
(a) No person other than members of the family residing on the premises shall be engaged in such occupation;
(b) The use of the dwelling unit for the home occupation shall be clearly incidental and subordinate to its use for residential purposes by its occupants, and not more than twenty-five (25) percent of the floor area of the dwelling unit shall be used in the conduct of the home occupation;

Under applicable law, unless Defendant resides at 308 Hemphill Avenue, she is in violation of the Chattanooga Zoning Ordinance.
19. Defendant has owned the house at 308 Hemphill since about 1969. This house contains about 3000 square feet. It has a living room, dining room, breakfast room, kitchen, three bedrooms, and two baths on the main level, and then it has a large play room and an office and a bath on the second level, and it has a two-car garage.

20. On or about November 15, 2003, Defendant signed a lease for the property at 3442½ Alta Vista Drive with the property owner Russell Scott. The initial lease agreement required the dependant to pay $200 per month rent on or before the first day of each consecutive month. The investigation has established that the defendant did not pay Mr. Scott any rental payment of $200 for any month. The defendant claims that Mr. Scott did not want to have any additional income and that instead they informally agreed almost immediately that she would pay the electric bill on one of the two meters to the Alta Vista property as rent in lieu of $200 per month.
21. The investigation by the City Attorney has discovered that the Aapartment@ at 3442½ Alta Vista contains about four hundred square feet. It is really just one room, but is divided into a bedroom, a little eating area, and a small kitchen.
22. Defendant has stated during this investigation that the Aapartment@ at 3442½ Alta Vista was Afurnished.@. The investigation of the City Attorney has established that the Aapartment@ at 3442½ Alta Vista included a usable kitchen, but the defendant never did any cooking there. Defendant has admitted that she never moved any chairs, beds, or furniture to Alta Vista Drive.
23. The investigation of the City Attorney has established that Defendant uses 308 Hemphill to entertain her friends, clients and political acquaintances. The Alta Vista property, however, does not have a dining room and is inadequate for such entertaining.
24. The investigation of the City Attorney has established that Defendant uses 308 Hemphill to do her laundry because it has a washer and dryer. The Alta Vista address does not have any laundry facilities.
25. The investigation of the City Attorney has established that Defendant’s three cats and a dog reside at 308 Hemphill Avenue. These animals were never moved to 3442½ Alta Vista Drive. 26. The investigation undertaken by the City Attorney has proven to his satisfaction that the defendant has regularly spent the night at 308 Hemphill Avenue since 2004 and as far as he can determine the defendant has never spent the night at 3442½ Alta Vista Drive.
27. The investigation of the City Attorney has established that Defendant maintains a land line telephone at the house on Hemphill Avenue. Defendant did not maintain any telephone at the apartment on Alta Vista Drive.
28. The Electric Power Board bills for the address of 3442½ Alta Vista Drive reflect minimal electric usage, while the Electric Power bills for 308 Hemphill Avenue reflect normal power usage for a residence of this size which is occupied.
29. Defendant changed her driver=s license registration from 308 Hemphill Avenue to 3442 Alta Vista Drive; however, her motor vehicle at all relevant times was registered to 308 Hemphill Avenue. The place or places of licensing or registration of the person=s personal property is relevant in determining residence pursuant to T.C.A. '2-2-122(b)(1)(C).
30. Defendant filed her federal income tax returns with home address listed at 308 Hemphill. Defendant maintained 308 Hemphill as the owner=s address for Hamilton County and City of Chattanooga real estate taxes. The place of payment is taxes is relevant in determining residence pursuant to T.C.A. '2-22-122(b)(1)(D).
31. Defendant maintained home owners insurance on the property at 308 Hemphill. Defendant did not maintain renters insurance on the property at 34422 or 3442 B Alta Vista. There must be appropriate action to change a residence pursuant to T.C.A. '2-22-122(a)(3).
32. The investigation by the City Attorney has established that Defendant regularly placed garbage and recyclables for pick-up by the City=s Department of Public Works at the 308 Hemphill address, but did not place garbage or recyclables for pick-up at the 34422 or 3442 B Alta Vista. There must be appropriate action to change a residence pursuant to T.C.A. '2-22-122(a)(3).
33. The house at 308 Hemphill Avenue has a two-car garage which houses the defendant’s 1988 Ford Mustang convertible. The registration for this vehicle is sent to 308 Hemphill Avenue as well as her car insurance premium which is calculated based upon where that vehicle is garaged. The Alta Vista address does not have a garage and no neighbor has admitted to seeing the defendant’s car at the Alta Vista address until one occasion in 2007.
34. The investigation has established that there was no separate mail box at the Alta Vista address. The defendant regularly got her mail at 308 Hemphill Avenue or a post office box that she established.
35. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 2-2-122(a)(3), it is clear that a person does not become a resident of a place solely by intending to make it one’s residence. There must be appropriate action consistent with the intention. The investigation of the City Attorney has established that he has reasonable cause to believe that no appropriate action was taken by defendant to change her residence from 308 Hemphill Avenue to 3442½ Alta Vista Drive so that she actually resided within District 6 at least one (1) year before qualifying for her office as required by Section 8.2 of the Chattanooga City Charter.
36. The investigation has established that neighbors have never seen the defendant move into the Alta Vista address and have never seen lights on in her apartment at night. None of her neighbors interviewed recalled any garbage or recyclables placed on the street for pick up at the Alta Vista address and no sounds were heard emanating from the apartment. The address at 308 Hemphill Avenue regularly has garbage and recyclable pickups showing signs of occupation by the defendant. An air conditioner is frequently heard at 308 Hemphill Avenue during summer months.
37. All of the defendant’s creditors send bills to the Hemphill address including her bills for credit cards, telephone bills, water, and electric bills. Her cable television statements from Comcast and her subscription to the Chattanooga Times-Free Press are delivered only to 308 Hemphill Avenue.
38. Defendant now claims to have recently moved to another address within District 6 which is 408 Sweetbriar as a result of unwarranted interference in the life of Mr. Russell Scott, her Alandlord@ at 3442½ Alta Vista. However, this claim of having recently moved in 2007 has no relevance as to whether the defendant was duly qualified to assume or hold the office of District 6 council member when she assumed that office in 2005.
CHARGES
CHARGE ONE
39. Chattanooga City Code, Part I, Sec. 8.2, the Charter of the City of Chattanooga sets forth the following requirement for persons seeking election to be a member of the City Council:
Sec. 8.2. Qualifications of council members.

The City shall be divided into nine (9) districts within the geographic boundaries of the city. The city council shall be composed of nine (9) members with each member elected from one of such single districts. The candidate for each council position who receives the majority of his or her district shall be elected. No person shall be elected or appointed as a member of the council who is not at least 21 years of age and who has not been a resident of the district for at least one year preceding his or her election.

40. Defendant filed a petition and statement of candidacy over her own signature for the District 6 seat with the board of election commissions on November 22, 2004 listing her qualifying address as 3442 Alta Vista Drive, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37411. The City Attorney charges that defendant did not reside at this address when she filed her nominating petition and further that she did not live within District 6 at any time relevant to her election to the District 6 City Council seat. The City Attorney further charges that the filing of false information with respect to this nominating petition violates T.C.A. ' 2-19-109 and justifies her ouster pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-101.
CHARGE TWO
41. T.C.A § 2-19-107(1) states:
2-19-107. Illegal registration or voting. -- A person commits a Class E felony who:
(1) Intentionally and knowing that such person is not entitled to, registers or votes in any manner or attempts to register or vote in any manner where or when such person is not entitled to under this title;…

42. On December 24, 2003, Defendant changed her voter registration with the Hamilton County Election Commission from 308 Hemphill Avenue, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37411 to 3442B Alta Vista Drive, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37411. (See Exhibit 1.)
43. The City Attorney avers that this defendant intentionally and knowingly registered to vote in a manner where or when such person is not entitled to register to vote at the 3442B Alta Vista Drive address in violation of T.C.A. 2-19-107 and justifies her ouster pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-101.
CHARGE THREE
44. Chattanooga City Code, Part I, Sec. 3.2, requires City Council members to take an oath of office as set forth below:
All officers of the city, before assuming the duties of office, shall enter into bond, as now required by law, and take and subscribe an oath that they possess the qualifications and are free from the disqualifications prescribed by this Act [section 3.1 of this Charter] and to faithfully discharge the duties of their respective offices, and such other oath or affirmation as may be now or hereafter prescribed by ordinance.
45. Defendant took the oath of office on April 18, 2005 from Judge Samuel H. Payne under affirmation that she possessed the qualifications and was free of the disqualifications prior to assuming the office of City Council member. The City Attorney charges that defendant committed official misconduct in office pursuant to T.C.A. '8-47-101 by assuming the office of City Council member when she was unqualified from doing so by not residing within District 6 for a period of one year preceding her taking office.
CHARGE FOUR
46. Chattanooga City Code, Part I, Sec. 3.1, captioned AEligibility for Office,@ provides in pertinent part: AIf, while any person is holding any popularly elected office under the city government, he shall cease to possess any or all of the qualifications, or become subject to any of the disqualifications herein prescribed, his office shall thereby become immediately vacant.@ The City Attorney charges that the defendant ceases to possess the qualification of residency for the District 6 City Council seat and that her office should thereby become immediately vacant.
47. Chattanooga City Code, Part I, Sec. 8.11, captioned “Vacancies,” provides in pertinent part: “Removal of residence by a member of the council from that member’s district shall constitute a vacancy in that member’s council position.”
48. The City Attorney charges that defendant has committed official misconduct in office pursuant to T.C.A. '8-47-101 by failing to do an act required by law to maintain her residence within City Council District 6 and failing to vacate her office.
WHEREFORE PETITIONER PRAYS:
1. That this Petition be filed and that Defendant be served with a copy as provided by law.
2. That Defendant be required to answer within twenty (20) days as provided by T.C.A. § 8-47-114.
3. That this matter be set early upon the docket in procedure over other civil actions at a time at least ten (10) days after an answer is filed pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-117.
4. That at a final hearing of this cause a judgment of ouster be rendered against Defendant and Defendant be ousted from office pursuant to T.C.A § 8-47-120.
5. That all costs of this action be assessed against the defendant.
6. In the event of any delay in hearing this action t, Petitioner requests that this court determine whether the defendant should be suspended from performing any duties of her office pending a final hearing and determination of this matter; and that the vacancy should be filled as the law provides for the filling of vacancies in such office and that such person filling such vacancy shall carry on the duties of the office until such hearing is finally determined in accordance with T.C.A. § 8-47-116.
7. That Petitioner be granted such further legal and equitable remedies which are authorized under T.C.A. § 8-47-101, et seq.
8. For any general relief authorized by law.

Respectfully submitted,

CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
RANDALL L. NELSON, CITY ATTORNEY

BY: __________________________________
RANDALL L. NELSON, BPR #001307
801 Broad Street, Suite 400
Chattanooga, TN 37402

Here is the suit filed by attorney Anderson:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

MARTHA P. RUTHERFORD, :
:
Plaintiff, :
: No. _______________
v. :
: Div. _________
THE CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, :
THE CHATTANOOGA CITY COUNCIL, : JURY DEMAND
and RANDALL NELSON, in his capacity :
as City Attorney for the City of Chattanooga :
:
Defendants. :

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

Martha P. Rutherford (“Plaintiff”), by and through her attorneys and pursuant to Rule 57 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, for Complaint against the City of Chattanooga, the Chattanooga City Council, and Randall Nelson, in his capacity as attorney for the City of Chattanooga (“the Defendants”) files this Petition for Declaratory Relief as follows:
1. Plaintiff Martha P. Rutherford resides at 408 Sweetbriar Avenue, Chattanooga, Hamilton County, Tennessee.
2. Defendant City of Chattanooga (“the City”) is a municipal corporation that may be served through the Chattanooga City Attorney, Randall L. Nelson, Office of the City Attorney, 801 Broad Street, Suite 400, Chattanooga, Tennessee, 37402.
3. The Defendant Chattanooga City Council (“the Council”) is the legislative and quasi-judicial branch of the City of Chattanooga. The Chattanooga City Council may be served through the Chattanooga City Attorney, Randall L. Nelson, Office of the City Attorney, 801 Broad Street, Suite 400, Chattanooga, Tennessee, 37402.
4. Defendant Randall L. Nelson is the City Attorney for the City of Chattanooga, and may be served at 801 Broad Street, Suite 400, Chattanooga, Tennessee, 37402.
5. This action is brought for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 29-14-101 et seq.
6. An actual controversy exists between the Plaintiffs and Defendants.
7. Jurisdiction and venue are proper.
8. The Plaintiff is a duly elected Councilwoman on the Chattanooga City Council, representing District 6.
9. In August of 2007, two (2) complaints were filed with the City relative to the Plaintiff’s residency.
10. As a result of the filing of these complaints, Defendant Nelson conducted an inquiry into the residence of the Plaintiff pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-103.
11. The City Attorney has advised the Plaintiff that the City Attorney has reasonable cause to institute an action for ouster pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-101, based upon an alleged violation of a penal statute involving moral turpitude.
12. The Plaintiff avers that she has not acted in any manner sufficient to violate a penal statute involving moral turpitude, and lacked the intent to violate any penal statute involving moral turpitude, and has therefore violated no such statute.
13. The Plaintiff avers that any action on any alleged violation of a penal statute involving moral turpitude is barred by the applicable statute of limitation and laches.
14. An actual existing and bona fide controversy exists between the Plaintiff and the Defendants as to whether there are grounds for the Defendants to file an action to oust the Plaintiff, and such controversy is of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment
15. The Plaintiff has a real interest in the question of whether grounds exist to oust the Plaintiff pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-101.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays:
a. That proper process issue to the Defendants requiring them to answer to this complaint within the time allowed by law;
b. For a declaratory judgment consistent with the jury verdict declaring that the Defendants have no grounds to file an action for ouster against the Plaintiff pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-47-101;
c. For such other and further relief as to this court may seem just and proper in addition to the costs and disbursements of this action.

Respectfully Submitted,
GRANT, KONVALINKA & HARRISON, P.C.

By:___________________________________
John R. Anderson (BPR No. 10732)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
633 Chestnut Street, Suite 900
Chattanooga, TN 37450-0900
423/756-8400
423/756-6518 – facsimile