The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that the Drug-Free School Zone Act does not apply when a defendant is convicted of facilitating the sale of drugs in a school zone.
In 2008, police raided a house in Davidson County where Stanley Bernard Gibson was visiting his girlfriend and found two duffel bags with cocaine and weapons. The duffel bags, one of which contained Mr. Gibson’s student identification, were on a chair where law enforcement officers had seen Mr. Gibson sitting before the raid. Police found another small bag of cocaine in Mr. Gibson’s pocket. His girlfriend’s house was within 1,000 feet of a school.
Mr. Gibson was indicted for the knowing possession with intent to deliver a half of a gram or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of Tennessee law. A Davidson County jury convicted Mr. Gibson of the lesser charge of facilitation of possession with intent to deliver the drugs within 1,000 feet of a school. The trial court applied the Drug-Free School Zone Act to increase the length of Mr. Gibson's minimum sentence and percentage of service before release eligibility. Mr. Gibson appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
The Legislature passed the Drug-Free School Zone Act to create drug-free zones around schools to protect students from illegal drug activities. To carry out this legislative intent, the Act enhances the punishment when a defendant is convicted of possessing or conspiring to possess drugs with intent to deliver or sell drugs within 1,000 feet of a school by increasing the felony classification for a longer sentence and by requiring the defendant to serve the entire minimum sentence.
The Supreme Court granted Mr. Gibson’s appeal to consider whether the Act applies when a defendant is convicted of the lesser charge of facilitation rather than the offenses of either possessing with intent to sell or deliver drugs or conspiracy to sell or deliver drugs within 1,000 feet of a school.
The State admitted the trial court erred by applying the Act to require service of the entire minimum sentence but argued the Act is a separate criminal offense and supports the higher felony classification.
In a unanimous opinion, the Court found that the Act does not apply to a conviction for facilitation. The Court reasoned that the Act lists the offenses to which it applies, and facilitation is not a listed offense. The Court concluded it is not at liberty to rewrite or add to a statute. Therefore, based on the plain language of the Act, the Court held that the Act does not include the offense of facilitation, reversed the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals, and remanded the case for the trial court to resentence Mr. Gibson. The Court also determined there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for facilitation and affirmed the conviction.
To read the opinion in State of Tennessee v. Stanley Bernard Gibson, authored by Justice Sharon G. Lee, visit the opinions section of TNCourts.gov.