posted June 13, 2005
Greg Beck can continue to serve on the County Commission as well as a court officer for City Court Judge Sherry Paty, Chancellor Howell Peoples has ruled.
Chancellor Peoples said in a 6-page ruling that the position of court officer for Chattanooga City Court "does not constitute an 'office.' Therefore, Mr. Beck is not disqualified from serving as court officer for City Court Judge Sherry Paty."
The city had filed suit, saying a section of the city ordinance bars a city employee from holding public office.
Chancellor Peoples several years ago ruled that Ron Swafford could not both serve a post in the Juvenile Court Clerk's office and also be on the City Council. But the chancellor said the facts in the Beck case were far different.
Commissioner Beck said, "I'm elated. It's quite a relief. I've been unsure of my status for the past four months.
"Now I plan to step up my work on the County Commission and in the community."
Mr. Beck had been named to the County Commission after JoAnne Favors left to serve in the Legislature.
He was formerly a security officer at the County Courthouse, then he was named to the court officer post by Judge Paty after her election.
Court costs were assessed against the city.
Mr. Beck was represented by attorney Jerry Summers.
Mr. Beck said he will face sizable legal costs, but does not know the full amount yet.
City Councilman Leamon Pierce, who had urged the filing of the lawsuit, was at the County Courthouse on Monday and congratulated Mr. Beck on winning the case.
Here is the full opinion:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the court on the City of Chattanooga’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. On June 3, 2005, the court held the trial in this matter and took the case under advisement. Having considered the matter, the Court issues the following Memorandum Opinion and Order.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
The facts of this case are not in dispute. City Court Judge Sherry Paty appointed Gregory Beck (“Mr. Beck”) on August 20, 2004, as a city court officer. After being appointed to his position in the City Court, Mr. Beck was appointed by the Hamilton County Commission to fill a vacancy in the office of County Commissioner on February 10, 2005. On March 8, 2005, the Plaintiff, City of Chattanooga, filed the complaint in this matter alleging that Mr. Beck unlawfully holds/exercises the office of Chattanooga City court officer. The Plaintiff’s allegations are based upon the provisions of Title 3 Section 3.1 of the Chattanooga City Charter (the “Charter”).
As a City court officer, Mr. Beck performs the typical duties of the position commonly referred to as a bailiff. His responsibilities include keeping order in the court, directing witnesses to the stand, and protecting the judge. He does not carry a weapon and is not a commissioned police officer. His position is defined by the Chattanooga City Code (the “Code”) Section 12-19, which provides:
(a) Each city judge is authorized to appoint or employ one (1) or more court officers subject to confirmation by the city council and upon such terms and conditions as may be required by the city council. A court officer so approved by the city council shall likewise be appointed as a special policeman pursuant to section 13.3 of the charter compilation. A court officer who is in attendance while court is in session shall be under the supervision of the presiding city judge and while court is in session all members of the police and fire department attending court shall be subordinate to and obey the instructions of the court officer. When court is not in session, or at times when a court officer is not needed for duty in the courtroom, or when not performing duties under the direction of a city judge all court officers shall then be engaged in serving warrants or other court process. The number of warrants or other court process served by a court officer shall be reported each week by the city court clerk to the city judges, the mayor, and the city finance officer. A court officer shall be an employee of the office of the city court.
(b) A court officer may be discharged, suspended or otherwise disciplined
by any city judge.
Under the Code, Mr. Beck should have taken an oath and been commissioned as a special policeman. However, testimony revealed that neither Mr. Beck nor the other City court officers have taken such an oath or been commissioned as special policemen. Beyond his courtroom duties, Mr. Beck works his remaining hours serving process.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether Mr. Beck as a City court officer, “holds any office” as prohibited by the Chattanooga City Charter and City Code.
2. If Mr. Beck holds an office with the City, whether Title 3 Section 3.1 of the Chattanooga City Charter violates the separation of powers as mandated by the Tennessee Constitution.
III. DISCUSSION
Because the court decides the first issue in the negative, it is unnecessary to address the Constitutional issue.
Title 3 Section 3.1 of the Charter states the following:
No person, while holding any office or employment under the federal, state or county government, except the office of notary public, shall be eligible to any office under said city government. . . . If, while any person is holding any office under the city government, he shall cease to possess any or all of the qualifications, or become subject to any of the disqualifications herein prescribed, his office shall thereby become immediately vacant.
Under the Charter, no person holding any “office” with the City of Chattanooga may also hold any office or employment under the county government. As a County Commissioner, Mr. Beck holds an office under the county government. Therefore, if his position as a city court officer is an “office” under the city government, he will be disqualified from his position.
In Day v. Sharp, the Tennessee Supreme Court quoted with approval the case of United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. (U.S.), 385, 18 L. Ed. 830, in which the United States Supreme Court held that the term “office” implies “the right to exercise the functions of a public trust or employment, and to receive the fees and emoluments belonging to it, and to hold the place for the term prescribed by law.” 161 S.W. 994, 996 (Tenn. 1913). Stated differently, the term “office” “embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.” State Ex rel. Thompson v. Crump, 183 S.W. 505 (Tenn. 1915). Building upon the attributes of the term “office” listed above, the Tennessee Supreme Court made an instructional decision in the case of Wise v. City of Knoxville, 250 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1952). In Wise, the Tennessee Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether a policeman held an “office” with the City of Knoxville. Id. If the policeman had been found to hold an “office”, he would have been entitled to full back salary without deduction. Id. at 92. However, the Court ruled that a policeman did not hold an “office” under the City of Knoxville Charter and reasoned as follows:
An "officer" when used in the sense of one who holds an “office” which entitles him to the salary for the entire term, carries with it the idea of tenure for a definite duration, definite emoluments and definite duties which are fixed by statute.
The charter of the City of Knoxville from beginning to end refers to policemen as employees. Charter, Secs. 121, 123 and 124. In these charter provisions, policemen and firemen are referred to together. Certainly it cannot be said that a fireman is an officer.
If a policeman is injured in line of duty, he receives employee benefits as a railroad employee would. If the Mayor, who is an officer, is injured in line of duty, he does not receive employee benefits in such a manner.
A City Director, under the charter of Knoxville, can retire a policeman or any other employee but cannot retire an official.
The city policeman is paid a salary like a railroad engineer or brakeman. He must report at a certain hour and goes off duty at a certain hour. He does the work assigned to him like a secretary or a nurse at a municipal hospital.
A policeman is not an officer; but a mayor, a sheriff or a judge is an officer.
Id. at 93, 94.
If the term “office” “entitles [an officer] to the salary for the entire term, carries with it the idea of tenure for a definite duration, definite emoluments and definite duties which are fixed by statute,” Mr. Beck does not qualify as holding an “office”. First, Mr. Beck clearly has no tenure because he can be fired at any time. Second, with regard to the notion of a definite duration, section 12-19 of the Code does not set a term or any specific duration for the City court officer. In fact, the testimony reveals that the duration of Mr. Beck’s employment is wholly dependent upon the City Court Judge’s discretion. Third, while Mr. Beck receives emoluments from his position as a court officer, it is unclear what would constitute definite emoluments for a court officer. Fourth, while it is true that a city court officer has definite duties defined by the Code, his duties do not constitute a generally recognizable function of the judicial branch of government. A city court officer does not make judicial decisions or any of the other duties necessary for the operation of the judicial branch of government. Also, the testimony in this case revealed that although the duties of the city court officer, as set forth in the Code require that he become appointed as a special policeman, neither Mr. Beck nor the other city court officers currently serving have been commissioned as special policemen.
Section 12-19 of the Code, the only section that addresses the position of city court officer, states that “[a] court officer shall be an employee of the office of the city court.” While the reference to the city court officer as an employee is not conclusive evidence that the position is not an “office”, the City of Chattanooga was unable to present any section of the Charter or Code that refers to the position as an “office”. Further, as an employee of the office of the City Court, the city court officer receives the same salary, benefits, and rights as other employees. By contrast, Chapter 2 of Title 4 of the Charter sets forth the salary and other specific duties of the City Judge who clearly holds an “office.” The Charter sets forth a specific minimum salary for City Court Judges but does not provide any specific employment terms for a city court officer. The city court officer does the work assigned to him by the City Court Judge and works the hours that are required of him by the City Court Judge. In fact, he “may be discharged, suspended or otherwise disciplined by any city judge.” Since Mr. Beck can be fired at any time he is essentially an employee at will.
Applying the reasoning of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Wise to the present case, the court concludes that the position of court officer for the Chattanooga City Court does not constitute an “office”. Therefore, Mr. Beck is not disqualified from serving as court officer for City Court Judge, Sherry Paty.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment is dismissed with costs taxed against the Plaintiff.
ENTER:
_________________________________
Howell N. Peoples
Chancellor, Part 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and exact copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order has been placed in the United States Mail addressed to:
Mr. Jerry H. Summers
Summers & Wyatt
500 Lindsay Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37403
Phillip A. Noblett, Esq.
D. Marty Lasley, Esq.
OFFICE OF CITY ATTORNEY
801 Broad Street, Suite 400
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402
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