Chancellor Frank Brown has ruled that the Sheriff's Civil Service Board does not have the authority to set pay.
He put down a memorandum opinion in the case in which Sheriff Jim Hammond filed suit, claiming the board's ruling that pay for sergeants should be equalized could wind up costing the county $1 million.
Chancellor Brown said, "Obviously, the sheriff has taken some actions to assist some sergeants. He raised the pay rate of some sergeants to the average pay of all sergeants. Perhaps, he can do more in the future. Perhaps this issue should be addressed to the County Commission, which is the legislative body. The County Commission not only obtains revenues through taxes but then allocates revenues to the HCSD and others through the budgetary process.
"The one point made by this court is that the board does not have the legal power to make equal the pay for each and every sergeant employed by the HCSD."
The Chancery Court suit was also lodged against Chris Harvey, Ricky Jones, Mark King, Mark Kimsey, Mark Williams and Jody Mays - sergeants who sought the equalization.
The suit, filed by attorney Dee Hobbs, says on Nov. 6, 2009 that Sgt. Eric Merkle tendered a Freedom of Information Act request to Don Gorman, director of administration, asking for the list of pay for those with the sergeant title.
It said six days later, Sgts. Merkle and Harvey met with Sheriff Hammond and Mr. Gorman "at which time Sheriff Hammond proposed a solution relative to an equalization of pay for the sheriff's sergeants classification."
The sergeants met Nov. 16 and agreed on an alternative proposal, it was stated.
On Dec. 2, 2009, Sgts. Merkle and Harvey met with Sheriff Hammond and he rejected their proposal, the suit says.
It said the sheriff met with all sergeants on Dec. 14, 2009, regarding his proposal to equalize pay. He also met on May 21, 2010, with Hal North, attorney for the sergeants, on the issue. A grievance was filed Sept. 20, 2010.
The board ruled Jan. 27 of this year that there was a disparity in sergeants' pay and sustained the grievance. The three-member panel unanimously sided with the six sergeants who had filed the grievance.
Sheriff Hammond at the time said it would cost $80,000 to put all the sergeants at the level of the highest-paid sergeant - just under $50,000.
He said, "This is going to open up Pandora's Box. Personnel in other departments are going to want the same thing when they find out that someone is making more than they are."
Attorney Hal North, who represents the five sergeants, said earlier, "If Pandora's Box was opened up, it was Sheriff Hammond who opened it. The board agreed with us that there was no rhyme nor reason why some sergeants were making more than others. It was not based on experience or any other factor.
"The sheriff just said he could pay people what he wanted."
Attorney North, who is a former chairman of the Sheriff's Civil Service Board, said captains, lieutenants and corporals were all making the same, but the disparity was among the sergeants. He said the range was from $43,869 made by Sgt. Williams to a high of over $49,000 made by Sgt. David Rodery.
He said after the grievance was filed that those making the least were brought up to the average sergeant pay. He said that put them at about $45,000, but still $4,000 below the pay of Sgt. Rodery.
Sheriff Hammond said Sgt. Rodery was at that pay level because he has had a long career with the department and was already higher paid when he asked to switch from detective to sergeant.
Sheriff Hammond earlier said he did not have the $80,000 in his budget and would have to ask the County Commission for a budget amendment.
He said, "When other personnel start asking for the same thing, I know the county won't come up with the $1 million to cover that."
The Sheriff's Civil Service Board includes Jack Benson Jr., Bucky McCulley and Chairman William Pippin.
Here is the full opinion:
IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE
JIM HAMMOND, : DOCKET NO. 11-0215
Sheriff of Hamilton County and
HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE :
PETITIONERS, :
v. :
CHRIS HARVEY, RICKY JONES, : PART 1
MARK KING, MARK KIMSEY, MARK
WILLIAMS, JODY MAYS and the :
HAMILTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD :
RESPONDENTS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. THE BACKGROUND
Sheriff Jim Hammond (“Sheriff Hammond”) and Hamilton County, Tennessee (“the County”), sometime referred to collectively as “the Petitioners,” filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Judicial Review of a decision rendered by the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office Civil Service Board (“the Board”). The Board, on a grievance by six sergeants of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department (“HCSD”), held that Sheriff Hammond had to equalize the pay for all 19 sergeants employed by the HCSD. The sergeants and the Board may be collectively referred to as “the Respondents.”
Sheriff Hammond and the County assert that the Board does not have the legal authority to make its decision. Therefore, the Sheriff and County argue that the Board’s opinion and decision must be reversed and set aside.
The court signed the writ of certiorari. The record, before the Board, has been filed. Both sides have filed the Briefs. On July 5, 2011, the court heard and denied the Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss the Petition due to Petitioners’ failing to file their brief within thirty (30) days of the filing of the transcript, pursuant to the local rules of civil practice. At that time, counsel for both parties agreed to waive oral argument and allow the court to decide the case on the written record. The court then took the case under advisement. Having reviewed and researched the issues, the court now issues its Memorandum Opinion and Order in this case.
II. THE LEGAL ISSUE
Did the decision of the Board, that the Sheriff had to equalize the pay of all sergeants in the HCSD, exceed “the statutory authority” of the Board?
III. THE BASIC FACTS
Succinctly started, this case involves whether Sheriff Hammond must pay all 19 sergeants employed by the HCSD the same pay. Sgt. Eric Merkle began this process by requesting, on November 6, 2009, a list of all sergeants and their hourly pay. Thereafter, Sgt. Merkle and Sgt. Chris Harvey met with Don Gorman, the Director of Administration with the HCSD, and Sheriff Hammond to discuss the issue. After the discussion, Sheriff Hammond made a proposal to resolve the issue. This offer was rejected by the sergeants. They then made a proposal to the Sheriff. He rejected their proposal. Despite subsequent meetings and discussions among various persons and some action by Sheriff Hammond, no agreement was reached.
Then, six sergeants filed a formal grievance concerning the disparity in pay with the Sheriff on September 22, 2010. Sheriff Hammond denied the grievance and relief was then sought from the Board. On January 27, 2011, the Board heard evidence from Sheriff Hammond and Mr. Gorman. There is a difference or disparity among the pay of the 19 sergeants employed by the HCSD. Various reasons were stated for the pay differences. The pay for captains and corporals was the same. There was a small difference in the pay among the lieutenants. The Board issued a final order on January 31, 2011. Sheriff Hammond and the County then filed their petition and sought judicial review of the Board’s decision.
IV. THE LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Sheriff Hammond and the County filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Judicial Review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 et seq. Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-9-111 details hearings and findings by the court. Further, Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114 covers decisions of civil service boards. Subsection (a)(1) and (b)(1) of this statute state that the state’s Administrative Procedures Act and the judicial review standards in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 govern the judicial review process.
B. Judicial Review Standards.
Judicial review of civil service boards is governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (g)-(j), which states as follows.
(g) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken in the court.
(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provision;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(5) (A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.
(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
(i) No agency decision pursuant to a hearing in a contested case shall be reversed, remanded or modified by the reviewing court unless for errors that affect the merits of such decision.
(j) The reviewing court shall reduce its findings of fact and conclusions of law to writing and make them parts of the record.
C. The Statutory Basis for the Board.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-401 et seq. was adopted by the general assembly in 1974. These statutes are known as the “County Sheriff’s Civil Service Law of 1974.” Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-402 required approval by two-thirds (⅔) of the county legislative body before the Act became effective in a particular county. Hamilton County adopted the law in 1980 and such served as the basis for the creation of the Board and certain other provisions relating to the HCSD.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-409 sets forth the powers and duties of the civil service board established pursuant to the 1974 laws. This statute provides:
Powers and duties of board. – The board as a body shall:
(1) Adopt and amend rules and regulations for the administration of this part;
(2) Make investigations concerning the enforcement and effect of this part and require observance of the rules and regulations made thereunder;
(3) Hear and determine appeals and complaints respecting the administration of this part;
(4) Establish and maintain a roster of all employees of the classified service and the office of the sheriff showing their position, rank, compensation and place of residence;
(5) Ascertain and record the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to all positions in the classified service and classify such positions in the manner hereinafter provided;
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this part, formulate and hold competitive tests to determine the qualifications of persons who seek employment in any position, and as a result of such tests, establish employment lists of eligibles for the various positions;
(7) Establish records of performance and a system of service ratings to be used to determine promotions, the order of layoffs and reemployment and for other purposes;
(8) Keep any other such records as may be necessary for the proper administration of this part; and
(9) Determine all fringe benefits to employees coming under the provisions of this part.
The court also noted the following statutes: Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-411 and 412. These two statutes provide:
8-8-411. Classification plan.- The board shall, as soon as practical after this part becomes operative, adopt a classification plan and make rules for its administration. The position classification plan may, if desired, create different classes of positions within each position in the classified service. The position classification plan shall show the duties, authorities, responsibilities and character of work required of each position and class thereof as to education, experience, capabilities, knowledge and skill. As far as practical, the probable lines of promotion to and from the classes of positions shall be indicated.
8-8-412. Creation of new positions – Abolition of old positions. – The board may, upon request of and by the advice of the sheriff, create new positions or combine, alter or abolish existing positions in such manner as the board acting under the advice of the sheriff deems necessary for the effective operation of the office of sheriff. No position in the classified service shall be abolished except upon approval of the board acting in good faith upon the advice of the sheriff.
D. “In Excess of Statutory Authority.”
The Petitioners focus on the ground set forth in (h)(2) above, i.e., the Board’s decision exceeded its statutory authority. A number of decisions of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court bring into focus the meaning of this phrase.
In County of Shelby v. Tompkins, 241 S.W.3d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), the court considered a requirement of the Shelby County Charter that required all Shelby County employees to be and remain a resident of Shelby County. Mr. Tompkins, a firefighter, was terminated by the Fire Department for violating this provision. However, the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board revoked the termination and instead suspended Mr. Tompkins without pay for the time he was out-of-work pending the Board’s decision. On appeal, the trial court reinstated the termination on the basis that the Board exceeded its authority. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Fire Department and the chancellor. Because the Shelby County Charter required residency in Shelby County as a condition of employment, the Civil Service Merit Board had no authority to change the law and change a termination into a suspension. Thus, the Board exceeded its authority and, therefore, its decision was erroneous and a nullity.
Another example of a violation in excess of authority is found in Town of Rogersville, v. Mid Hawkins County Utility District, 122 S.W.3d 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). In order for the Town of Rogersville to supply water service to certain persons, the district lines had to be withdrawn to remove those persons from the Mid Hawkins Count Utility District. Thus the town and its county executive sought to modify the utility district’s boundaries. However, Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-82-202(b) relates only to the creation of a utility district and not the amending of a utility district’s boundaries. The Court of Appeals pointed out that only the General Assembly could change the boundaries of an existing utility district. Thus, the County Executive’s decision was “vacated in that he acted ‘in excess of the statutory authority of the agency.’ Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (h)(2).”
Further, the case of Wayne County v. Solid Waste Disposal Control Board, 756 S.W.2d 274 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) is helpful. In this case the Board determined that the Wayne County landfill was a nuisance and contaminated a neighbor’s water supply. Thus, the Board ordered the County (1) to close the landfill and (2) to supply the adjoining landowner with an uncontaminated water supply. The chancellor reversed the second part of the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by then Judge, now Justice, Koch stated:
The county also insists that the Board exceeded its authority by ordering it to provide the Gallahers with a permanent supply of uncontaminated water. The trial court agreed. While the Tennessee Solid Waste disposal Act (“Act”) gives the Board broad authority to take steps to abate acts causing a nuisance to the public in general, we concur with the trial court’s determination that the Board does not have the statutory authority to fashion remedies in essentially private nuisance actions. This relief must be found in the court.
Administrative agencies derive their authority from the General Assembly. Thus, their power must be based expressly upon a statutory grant of authority or must arise therefrom by necessary implication. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Southern Ry. 554 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tenn. 1977); General Portland, Inc. v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Air Pollution Control Bd., 560 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). Even though statutes like the Act should be construed liberally because they are remedial, Big Fork Mining Co. v. Tennessee Water Quality Bd., 620 S.W.2d 515, 519-20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), the authority they vest in an administrative agency must have its source in the language of the statutes themselves. Williams v. American Plan Corp., 216 Tenn. 435, 443, 392 S.W.2d 290, 924 (1965); Madison Loan & Thrift Co. v. Neff, 648 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
* * * * *
The Act’s remedies are designed to protect the public health and to conserve and enhance the environment. When violations occur, the Act gives the regulators broad authority to stop the violation and to order steps to remedy or mitigate its effects. The Act does not explicitly provide a private right of action for persons who have been damaged as a result of a violation. Nor does it explicitly empower the Commissioner or the Board to grant or seek legal or equitable relief on behalf of those who have been damaged.
The Board claims that it has the authority to fashion remedies for essentially private wrongs even though the Act does not give it explicit authority to do so. Asserting that the authority is implicit in its authority to abate public nuisances and to issue orders of correction, the Board argues that its interpretation of the Act is reasonable and consistent with the Act’s purposes.
Notwithstanding the logic and appeal of the Board’s position, it provides an insufficient basis for this Court to engraft remedies onto the Act that were not put there by the General Assembly. It is not our role to determine whether a party’s suggested interpretation of a statute is reasonable or good public policy or whether it is consistent with the General Assembly’s purpose. We must limit our consideration to whether the power exercised by the Board is authorized by the express words of the statute or by necessary implication therefrom.
We have determined that nothing in the Act expressly gives the Board or the Commissioner the authority to grant remedial relief to private parties. The Commissioner’s and the Board’s authority to provide relief for injuries to the general interests of the public will not be diminished by their inability to provide private remedies. Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor proper to find the power to redress private wrongs between the lines of the statutes.
Id. at 281-83.
Finally, the case of City of Memphis v. The Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis, No W2003-02799-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 895 (Dec. 29, 2004) discusses well the legal issues. With regard to the § 322(h)(2) issue, the Court of Appeals held:
“The charter of the city is the organic law of the corporation, being to it what the constitution is to the state….” State v. Bowman, 814 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). A civil service commission must act within the parameters of the charter which created it. State ex rel. Atkin v. City of Knoxville, 203 Tenn. 622, 315 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. 1958); see also Fox v. Miles, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90, No. W2002-01860-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 239762, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2004). If a civil service commission exceeds its jurisdiction or its authority in reviewing an employee’s case, it has acted illegally and in excess of its statutory authority. City of Memphis v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 1985 WL 3717, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 16.
In the case at bar, the Board was created pursuant to general, state law. Thus, the Board can have, at best, only the power and authority granted to such boards by the state law. The Hamilton County Civil Service Manual was not part of the transcript. This case is governed by state law and not the Manual because, as will be seen in the next section, items stated in the Manual cannot contravene state law.
E. The Tennessee Supreme Court’s Decision.
There has been one decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court that construes Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-409. That decision, Crawley v. Hamilton County, 193 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 2006), involved the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) and an act of Hamilton County creating an exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. Mr. Crawley was hurt while employed by the HCSD as a corrections officer in the jail. Hamilton County did not vote to be bound by the provisions of the Tennessee workers’ compensation laws. Instead, Hamilton County adopted a provision in 1997 and placed such under its Civil Service Policy for the Sheriff’s Department. Thus, under local act, an injured employee of the HCSD could recover no more than salary for one year and medical expense for three years for job-related injuries. This provision was in lieu of worker’s compensation benefits.
Mr. Crawley filed suit and alleged that the local legislation violated his rights by depriving him of his rights to sue Hamilton County under the GTLA, a state statute. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court agreed with him. Hamilton County argued that payment of money in lieu of salary and medical expenses were fringe benefits available to employees and that the Civil Service Board had the right to determine fringe benefits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-409(9).
The Supreme Court responded:
[W]e find, however, that compensation for on-the-job injuries arising out of and during the course of employment does not constitute a “fringe benefit.” Fringe benefits are defined as “[s]ide, non-wage benefits which accompany or are in addition to a person’s employment. . .” Black’s Law Dictionary 667-68 (6th ed.1990); see also Hamblen County Educ. Ass’n v. Hamblen County Bd. Of Educ. 892 S.W.2d 428, 432-33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that fringe benefits are “benefits which accrue to an employee by reason of his employment other than the employee’s salary or wages”). Compensation for an on-the-job injury is intended as a substitute for the worker’s lost wages, not as a supplement to those wages. See Mackie v. Young Sales Corp. 51 S.W.3d 554, 556 (Tenn. 2001).
Id. at 455.
On the other hand, the GTLA was to codify the common law on sovereign immunity and specify the circumstances when local governments may be sued for negligence. Thus, the Crawley court held:
[T]he authority granted counties to define written personnel policies, including fringe benefits, does not grant those same counties the power to suspend or remove the statutorily-based negligence action provided by the GTLA.
“Municipal ordinances in conflict with and repugnant to a State law of a general character and state-wide application are universally held to be invalid.” Southern Ry. Co. v. City of Knoxville, 223 Tenn. 90, 442 S.W.2d 619, 621 (1968); see also State ex rel. Beasley v. Mayor & Alderman of Town of Fayetteville, 196 Tenn. 407. 268 S.W.2d 330, 334 (1954) (holding that a city or county “may not pass an ordinance which ignores the State’s own regulatory acts, or deny rights granted by the state or grant rights denied by the State and thus in effect nullify the State law”). Such agreements are also repugnant to public policy because they allow an employer to insulate itself from tort liability to an employee for an on-the-job injury. Thus, we hold that the portion of the Civil Service Policy which purports to exclude the employee from seeking other relief is void because the employee retains the right to sue Hamilton County under the GTLA.
Id. at 456-57.
It appears implicit in the Crawley decision that, even though the Board may be given the power and duty to set fringe benefits, it does not have the power to set salary or wages. Such power was not given to the Board and its decision to equalize the salary or wages of all sergeants employed by the HCSD is beyond the statutory authority granted to the Board. The Board’s decision is in excess of its statutory authority and a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-409. The court also notes that there are no provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-8-411 nor 412 which gives the board the right to set or adjust salaries.
F. Jurisdiction or Authority of the Board.
Finally, the court must address the jurisdiction or authority of the Board. The
sergeants were certainly of the opinion that filing a grievance with Sheriff Hammond
and appealing to the Board was the proper procedure to follow. Indeed, counsel for the
Petitioners stated that the issues of jurisdiction were resolved. Transcript at 4-5.
As noted, the court disagrees. If the above citations of authority are not enough
to make the point that the Board lacked the authority or jurisdiction to equalize the
sergeants’ pay, the case of Faust v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, 206 S.W.2d 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) should help. In that case,
civilian employees of the police department sued to get the same enhanced benefits as uniformed personnel. The Court of Appeals held the local government could have two categories of employees for pension plan purposes, i.e. uniformed and non-uniformed employees. However, as part of the process of going from an old plan to a new plan, the pension committee and then the Benefit Board interpreted the old, former ordinance to apply to all employees of the Fire Department employed prior to July l1, 1995. The civilian police employees then sued to get the same benefits as the civilians employed by the fire department.
The Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor and held that the Benefit Board’s construction of the ordinance was wrong. The Court of Appeals held:
The actions of the Board of September 11 and December 11, 1995, resulted in a construction of the term “uniformed fire services” that contravened the legislative mandates of MCL, Section 3.08.011(c). Parties cannot gain vested rights in an erroneous interpretation by an administration agency of a legislative act. Far Tower Sites, LLC v. Knox County, 126, S.W.3d 52, 63-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). An administrative agency has a right to revisit and reinterpret its previous construction of a legislative act whether or not the previous construction is erroneous, absent the intervention of vested rights. Thompson v. Dept. of Codes Admin., 20 S.W.3d 654, 663 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 493. The Court of Appeals discussed many cases where administrative mistakes
were made and persons acquired no vested rights.
The following quote is the essence of this case:
The Board is an administrative authority, not a legislative authority. No administrative agency can exercise control over matters which the legislature has not seen fit to delegate to it and actions beyond the authority of the agency can have no force or effect. Westly v. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. Bd. of Admin., 105 Cal. App. 4th 1095, 1106, 130 Cal. Rptr.2d 149, 158 (2003).
Id. at 498. In effect, an administrative agency is analogous to the judicial system, where the general rule of subject matter jurisdiction is thus stated:
Want of jurisdiction of the subject matter can neither be waived, nor conferred by consent, estoppel, appearance or pleadings, and objection for want of such jurisdiction can be made at any time and is fatal whenever presented.
17 Tenn. Jur., Jurisdiction, § 14 (2004).
The general assembly has not given Sheriffs’ Civil Service Boards the right to set salaries for any Sheriffs’ Department or the right to equalize pay for all persons in a classification of employees.
V. THE CONCLUSION
The court has not made a detailed examination of the transcript of the record presented to the Board. The Petitioners did not object to the Board’s decision as being unsupported by substantial and material evidence. Thus, the court deems the record to contain substantial and material evidence for the Board’s decision.
Obviously, the Sheriff has taken some actions to assist some sergeants. He raised the pay rate of some sergeants to the average pay of all sergeants. Perhaps, he can do more in the future. Perhaps this issue should be addressed to the County Commission, which is the legislative body. The County Commission not only obtains revenues through taxes but then allocates revenues to the HCSD and others through the budgetary process.
The one point made by this court is that the Board does not have the legal power to make equal the pay for each and every sergeant employed by the HCSD.
The above sets forth the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based upon such, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:
1. The Petitioner’s request for Judicial Review by the writ of certiorari is granted;
2. The decision of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Civil Service Board, issued on January 31, 2011, requiring Sheriff Hammond to equalize the salaries or wages of all sergeants employed by the HCSD is set aside and declared null and void because the Board’s decision is in violation of statutory provisions and in excess of the statutory authority of the Board; and
3. The costs of this appeal are adjudged against the Respondents, for which execution may enter.